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Abstract 
Judges’ Treatment of the Knowing and Intelligent Requirements for Miranda Waivers 
Heather Zelle 
Naomi E. S. Goldstein, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
The United States Supreme Court requires that waivers of constitutional rights, including 
the rights described by the Miranda warnings, be made knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily.  The Court and state courts have repeatedly invoked the requirements when 
determining the validity of Miranda waivers; however, the distinction between the two 
cognitive requirements (knowing and intelligent) has not been clearly delineated.  The 
current study examined whether judges distinguish between knowing and intelligent 
when they make determinations of Miranda waiver validity.  It was hypothesized that 
judges would distinguish between the knowing and intelligent requirements, which would 
be reflected by differences in judges’ ratings of waiver validity for hypothetical 
defendants with different levels of Miranda rights comprehension.  It was hypothesized 
that defendant’s age would moderate the relationship between Miranda comprehension 
and judges’ ratings of Miranda waiver validity.  Participants were 124 judges randomly 
selected from 49 U.S. states, each of whom received a packet of materials by mail 
containing a hypothetical capacity to waive Miranda rights evaluation report, a 
questionnaire about the validity of the hypothetical defendant’s Miranda waiver, and a 
demographics survey.  Analysis of variance of judges’ ratings of waiver validity on a 
continuous scale revealed that judges distinguished between knowing and intelligent, but 
suggested that defendant age may not moderate the relationship.  Logistic regression of a 
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dichotomous valid/invalid rating indicated that Miranda comprehension and defendant 
age were significant predictors of judges’ decisions about waiver validity. 
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE SURVEY 
 The United States Supreme Court established the concept of Miranda warnings as 
a mechanism for protecting individuals from unwittingly waiving the constitutional rights 
that are implicated during custodial interrogation (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966).  The Court 
was primarily concerned with assuring that the 5
th
 Amendment protection against self-
incrimination was not circumvented during custodial interrogation.  The Court reasoned 
that suspects would be able to make informed decisions about whether to talk with police 
if they were first informed of the rights relevant to police interrogation (Miranda v. 
Arizona, 1966).  As a result, the Miranda warnings emphasized individuals’ 
comprehension of their rights and invoked the historical standard for the waiver of 
constitutional rights, which requires that an individual knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily relinquish the right (Escobedo v. Illinois, 1964). 
1.1  Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary Waivers 
 In Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), the Court noted that constitutional protections should 
not be lost because a suspect failed to claim his rights.  Waivers are defined as 
“intentional relinquishment[s] or abandonment[s] of a known right or privilege” (p. 464, 
emphasis added).  In other words, waivers must be active relinquishments of rights; a 
failure to act to assert one’s rights cannot constitute a waiver.1  Concerned with assuring 
that rights waivers were not predicated on suspect’s ignorance and failure to act, the 
Johnson Court held that when a constitutional right is waived, the trial court must 
determine whether the waiver was “intelligent and competent” (p.465).   
                                                 
1
 The Court later clarified that, in the context of Miranda, an explicit waiver is not “necessary or sufficient 
to establish waiver” and that the intent to waive can be inferred from a suspect’s actions (e.g., if the suspect 
demonstrates an understanding of the rights and chooses to talk with police) (North Carolina v. Butler, 
1979, p. 373). 
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The Court, in Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), reaffirmed the focus on an accused’s 
understanding of his constitutional rights, noting that constitutional rights must be held to 
apply until a suspect “intelligently and knowingly” waives them (p. 490, FN14).  In 
Brady v. United States (1970), the Court further explained that waivers of constitutional 
rights must be made “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely 
consequences” (p. 748).  Some courts and scholars have treated the first aspect 
(awareness of relevant details) as constituting the knowing requirement and the second 
aspect (awareness of consequences) as constituting the intelligent requirement (e.g., Clay 
v. Arkansas, 1994; Frumkin & Garcia, 2003; Grisso, 1981, 2003; Oberlander, Goldstein, 
& Goldstein, 2003; Pennsylvania  v. DeJesus, 2001).  In this way, the distinction between 
knowing and intelligent parallels the distinction between factual and rational 
understanding established by the Dusky standard for competence to proceed (Frumkin & 
Garcia, 2003). 
 Voluntariness focuses on whether a waiver was coerced by police.  Cases like 
Brown v. Mississippi (1936) and Chambers v. Florida (1940) established protections 
against physically coercive interrogation practices.  Ashcraft v. Tennessee (1944) 
expanded that protection to address psychologically coercive practices (e.g., a 36 hour 
interrogation).  Overall, courts’ determinations of voluntariness have been based on 
police conduct and whether inherently coercive interrogation strategies may have 
overborne a suspect’s free will (Ashcraft, 1944). 
  The knowing, intelligent, and voluntary requirements apply to the waiver of 
constitutional rights and, therefore, to the relinquishment of the 5
th
 Amendment right 
against self-incrimination in the context of custodial interrogation.  If the validity of a 
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Miranda waiver is challenged, a judge must consider the characteristics of the defendant 
and the circumstances of the interrogation to determine whether the waiver was provided 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.   
1.2  Translating Legal Requirements into Psychological Constructs 
Psychological testing is often conducted to aid in determining whether a 
defendant had the capacity to waive his or her rights (Grisso, 1981, 1998).  Forensic 
evaluators typically assess whether a defendant appears to meet the knowing and 
intelligent requirements (Goldstein & Goldstein, 2010; Oberlander, Goldstein, & 
Goldstein, 2003; Oberlander & Goldstein, 2001).  Voluntariness may also be assessed by 
forensic evaluators; however, there is a qualitative difference between voluntariness (a 
primarily situational requirement) and knowing and intelligent (primarily cognitive 
requirements).  As a result, voluntariness challenges do not necessarily contain cognitive 
questions for clinicians to assess (Grisso, 1998). 
The legal constructs of knowing and intelligent correspond to the psychological 
constructs of understanding and appreciation, respectively (Goldstein & Goldstein, 2010; 
Grisso, 1981).  Understanding denotes an individual’s ability to understand the basic 
meaning of the warnings, and appreciation refers to an individual’s ability to grasp the 
importance of the warnings in the legal context and to recognize the consequences of 
waiving the rights (Grisso, 1981, 2003).  The distinction is theoretically significant 
because it provides two separate constructs that require independent measurement.  In 
addition, the distinction is practically meaningful because it reflects the fact that a suspect 
can meet the knowing requirement but fail to meet the intelligent requirement (Frumkin 
& Garcia, 2003; Grisso, 1998).  For example, a suspect may understand that he has the 
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right to have counsel present during interrogation, but he may mistakenly believe that 
counsel works for the state.  Such an error would cause the suspect to misinterpret the 
consequences of waiving his right to counsel, and, therefore, he would fail to meet the 
appreciation requirement.  In contrast, it appears theoretically impossible for an 
individual to fail the knowing requirement and pass the intelligent requirement.  The 
theoretical distinction between understanding and appreciation suggests that 
understanding is foundational because an individual cannot appreciate the significance of 
the rights without first understanding their basic meaning.  For example, how can an 
individual appreciate the benefit of asserting the right to counsel during an interrogation 
if the individual does not possess a basic understanding of the role of a lawyer or that he 
has the right to request a lawyer’s presence?   
Grisso (1998) developed instruments for assessing understanding and appreciation 
of Miranda rights.  Based upon the theoretical distinction between understanding and 
appreciation, he created four individual tools that target the two constructs separately 
(Grisso, 1998).  Each of the instruments is scored independently from the others and 
normative data is available for each.  The tools therefore help evaluators to assess 
understanding and appreciation independently and to compare an individual examinee’s 
scores to those of his or her peers.   
Recently, the theoretical distinction between understanding and appreciation was 
statistically validated.  Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of a revised version 
of the instruments indicated that the two constructs, while related, are distinct (Zelle, 
Goldstein, Riggs Romaine, & Kemp, in preparation).  The results of the analyses support 
the construct validity (specifically, the content and face validity) of the instruments, 
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indicating that the instruments measure two constructs that appear to correspond to the 
legal concepts for which the instruments were developed.  Nonetheless, the construct 
validity of the instruments would also be bolstered by clarifying the legal distinction 
between knowing and intelligent – that is, whether judges view the cognitively-based 
legal requirements of a valid waiver as separate constructs.   
1.3  Distinction between Knowing and Intelligent by Courts 
 Prior to reviewing whether and how courts distinguish between knowing and 
intelligent, two developments in case law and legislation should be noted.  The first 
involves recent developments in the Supreme Court’s treatment of the Miranda warnings 
and the second involves the development of juvenile-specific Miranda warning 
administration procedures by some states.  Both areas have the potential to narrow the 
pool of Miranda waivers that can be challenged by determining waiver validity based on 
factors other than whether a suspect comprehended the warnings. 
The Supreme Court recently revisited its Miranda precedent in Berghuis v. 
Thompkins (2010).  In Berghuis, the Court addressed what constitutes an invocation of 
the right to silence and held that in order to invoke the right, a suspect must make  
“simple, unambiguous statements” of his intention to do so (p. 2260).  Anything less than 
a clear statement of intent not to speak with police can be viewed as a waiver of the right.  
This shift may signal a retreat from a more active analysis of whether a defendant 
comprehended the rights before waiving them, and it is unclear how it will impact 
challenges under the knowing and intelligent requirements.  Challenges may be limited to 
cases involving active rights waivers or may apply to “passive” waiver cases, as well.  
Regardless of how Berghuis impacts Miranda waiver determinations, it is still important 
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to clarify the knowing and intelligent standard to better inform psychologists’ and 
psychiatrists’ evaluations of Miranda comprehension. 
 Another issue that may precede examination of the knowing and intelligent 
requirements arises from state law variations concerning administration of the Miranda 
warnings to juveniles.  Ten states inform juveniles of a right to parent access as part of 
their enhanced warnings for juveniles (Cruise, Pitchal, & Weiss, 2008).  Five states 
statutorily require parental (or legal guardian) presence during the interrogation of all 
juveniles, and another seven states statutorily require parental presence for juveniles of 
specified ages.  Of these states, eight require automatic suppression of a juvenile’s 
statements if the specialized procedures were not followed (Cruise, Pitchal & Weiss, 
2008).  The presence of such state laws and standards may result in some Miranda waiver 
determinations being resolved without challenges to the knowing and intelligent 
requirements because courts may find parental presence alone sufficient to satisfy the 
waiver requirements.  Nonetheless, as Cruise and colleagues (2008) note, it is unclear 
whether parent involvement facilitates a knowing and intelligent waiver.  Thus, clarifying 
the standard is important for those cases in which police complied with juvenile custodial 
interrogation standards, yet questions remain about the juveniles’ and/or 
parents’/guardians’ Miranda comprehension. 
Whereas the concepts of understanding and appreciation have been clearly 
distinguished in psychological theory (Grisso, 1981, 1998; Zelle et al., in preparation), 
the distinction between knowing and intelligent is less clear in case law (Viljoen, Zapf, & 
Roesch, 2007).  Appellate decisions in many states appear to hold a waiver valid when a 
suspect meets two requirements: 1) understanding of the basic factual elements of the 
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Miranda rights, and 2) appreciation of the consequences of the rights waived (e.g., 
Pennsylvania  v. DeJesus, 2001; Arkansas v. Bell, 1997; Clay v. Arkansas, 1994; 
Tennessee v. Stephenson, 1994; In re Patrick W., 1978).  A distinction between the 
knowing and intelligent requirements can also be found in United States Supreme Court 
opinions (e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 1986; Fare v. Michael C., 1979; Brady v. United States, 
1970; Escobedo v.  Illinois, 1964).  In particular, the Moran Court noted that an 
individual must be aware of both the nature and consequences of a Miranda waiver.  
Frumkin and Garcia (2003), drawing on Moran v. Burbine, summarized the Court’s 
treatment of rights waivers as consisting of two factors: uncoerced choice and rights 
comprehension.  The second factor, in turn, entails a two-fold awareness of both the 
nature of the right and the consequences of waiving it (Frumkin & Garcia, 2003).   
 Some state courts, however, have explicitly ruled that a basic understanding of the 
Miranda rights is sufficient for finding a waiver valid (e.g., Michigan v. Daoud, 2000; 
Michigan v. Cheatham, 1996; Illinois v. Bernasco, 1990).  Despite these rulings, the 
required level of comprehension remains unclear, and two recent opinions by the 
Appellate Court for the First District of Illinois demonstrate the ambivalence with which 
some courts approach Miranda waivers.  In Illinois v. Young (2006), the Appellate Court, 
citing Moran v. Burbine (1986), indicated that a waiver is valid if (1) it is uncoerced, and 
(2) the suspect knew he could remain silent and request a lawyer and that the State 
intended to use his statements against him.  Two years later, the same court held that a 
knowing and intelligent waiver is one in which the suspect had “a full awareness of both 
the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon 
it” (In re Dante W., 2008, p. 1044).   
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Other courts have taken an intermediate approach.  For example, some courts 
have clarified that a suspect does not need to understand every potential consequence of a 
waiver decision but should have some understanding of waiver consequences (e.g., 
Colorado v. Al Yousif, 2002; New Hampshire v. Bushey, 1982).  Similarly, the Supreme 
Court held in Colorado v. Spring (1987, p. 574) that a suspect does not need to “know 
and understand every possible consequence of waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege” 
in order to fulfill the waiver requirements.  The Court indicated that a valid waiver 
requires that the suspect both understand the relevant rights and recognize at least some 
consequences of abdicating those rights.  At the same time, however, the Court also 
seemed to suggest that recitation of the Miranda warnings was sufficient to protect the 5
th
 
Amendment privilege (Colorado v. Spring, 1987), even though the warnings do little to 
explain the consequences of a waiver.  It appears from this opinion that the use of a 
suspect’s statements against him is the only consequence of importance for determining 
waiver validity, as this was the only consequence described in the warnings used in that 
case (Colorado v. Spring, 1987; King, 2006). 
Overall, it appears that the Court does not consider the terms knowing and 
intelligent to be synonymous, yet the Court has never specifically delineated the 
distinction between the terms in its opinions (Grisso, 2003).  Similar to psychological 
interpretation of the terms, it appears possible that the Court considers knowing to consist 
of a foundational, basic understanding and intelligent to consist of an additional level of 
abstract comprehension.  Yet case law suggests that the Court may not requirement much 
appreciation beyond recognizing that statements can be used against an individual.  
Consequently, it remains unclear what fulfills the requirements and, specifically, whether 
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judges view a basic understanding of the rights as sufficient for a waiver determination or 
whether they require the higher level of understanding and appreciation. 
1.4  Current Study 
 Using a vignette-based format and experimental design, the current study 
examined whether judges distinguish between the concepts knowing and intelligent when 
they determine waiver validity.  Determining whether judges typically view knowing and 
intelligent as separate requirements is important for: 1) clarifying the general 
expectations of suspects in custodial interrogations, 2) determining whether there is a 
policy-based need to specify a more explicit distinction between the knowing and 
intelligent requirements, and 3) providing guidance to attorneys and forensic evaluators 
on the critical information to present to judges during Miranda-based suppression 
hearings.   
1.5  Hypotheses  
1.5.1  Primary hypothesis.   
It was expected that judges would distinguish between the knowing and 
intelligent requirements, which would be reflected by differences in judges’ ratings of 
waiver validity for defendants with different levels of understanding and appreciation.  
Specifically, it was hypothesized that judges would view defendants with good 
understanding and good appreciation as having provided significantly more valid waivers 
than defendants with good understanding and poor appreciation (or with poor 
understanding and poor appreciation). Through the remainder of the dissertation, these 
varying levels and combinations of understanding and appreciation will be referred to as 
“Miranda comprehension conditions.” 
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1.5.2  Secondary hypothesis.   
It was expected that defendant’s age would moderate the relationship between 
Miranda comprehension condition and judges’ ratings of Miranda waiver validity.  
Specifically, it was predicted that judges would rate adult defendants’ waivers as 
significantly more valid than juvenile defendants’ waivers within the same Miranda 
comprehension condition. 
1.5.3  Exploratory analyses.   
Exploratory analyses would examine whether judges’ validity ratings differed 
significantly across U.S. geographic regions and by judges’ demographic factors.2 
CHAPTER 2: METHODS 
The research involves a 2 (defendant’s age: 15 years, 25 years) x 3 (Miranda 
comprehension conditions: good understanding-good appreciation; good understanding-
poor appreciation; poor understanding-poor appreciation) between subjects design (see 
Figure 1). 
2.1  Participants 
 Participants were 124 judges
3
 (101 male, 20 female, and 3 who did not report sex)  
randomly selected from 49 U.S. states;
4
 responses were received from judges in 41 
states.
5
  Judges ranged in age from 42-77 years (M = 60.88, SD = 6.98), and reported 2-
36 (M = 15.29, SD = 8.49) year judgeships.  The sample was 85.5% Caucasian, 1.6% 
                                                 
2
  Exploratory analyses were initially planned to examine the degree to which judges conform to the 
controlling standards for waivers in their states.  However, there were insufficient data for these analyses; 
no/few judges responded from states (e.g., Michigan) with such standards. 
3
 Two additional judges completed the demographic questionnaire but returned the waiver validity survey 
without responding to any questions; these judges were excluded from the study. 
4
 New Jersey was excluded from this selection because the state restricts its judges from participation in 
research. 
5
 No judges in Alabama, California, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Oklahoma, or Rhode Island 
returned surveys. 
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African-American, 0.8% Asian-American, 0.8% American Indian, 1.6% Hispanic, and 
3.2% multiracial participants.  Eight participants (6.4%) did not indicate racial or ethnic 
identification.   
 Of respondents, 67.7% reported presiding over criminal court, 61.3% over civil 
court, 35.5% over juvenile court, and 37.9% over appellate court.  Judges also reported 
presiding over other types of court, such as family court (8.8%), traffic court (2.4%), and 
probate court (2.4%), or having general jurisdiction (4.0%).  Regarding location, 43.5% 
reported hearing cases in an urban area, 16.1% in a suburban area, 27.4% in a rural area, 
2.4% in both urban and rural areas, 1.6% in both suburban and rural areas, 4.8% in urban, 
suburban and rural areas, and 4.0% provided no information on this topic.  Judges also 
reported the position(s) they held before becoming a judge: 42.7% were prosecutors, 
41.9% criminal attorneys, 15.3% public defenders, 19.4% transactional lawyers, and 
68.5% civil trial lawyers.  Judges also reported other previous positions, such as military 
officer (1.6%) and professor (2.4%). 
 An a priori power analysis (power = .80, medium effect size, α = .05) indicated 
that 216 participants would be required for ANOVA analyses.  Survey research suggested 
that response rates of 20-35% could be expected for judges (Redding, Floyd, & Hawk, 
2001; Redding & Reppucci, 1999).  Based upon a conservative 20% estimate, 1080 
surveys were mailed to judges.  The return of 124 surveys resulted in an 11.5% return 
rate.  Post-hoc power analyses indicated that a power of 1.00 was achieved for the 
Miranda comprehension condition analyses, but only powers of .45 and .18 for the 
primary ANOVA analyses of the age and interaction effects. 
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2.2  Measures 
2.2.1  Hypothetical reports.   
A hypothetical psychologist’s capacity to waive Miranda rights evaluation report 
was mailed to each judge.  The hypothetical report was modeled on sample capacity to 
waive Miranda rights reports presented by Heilbrun, Marcyzk, and DeMatteo (2002).  
The hypothetical reports were identical across conditions, with the exception of details 
about the variables of interest, the two independent variables: defendant’s age (15 years, 
25 years) and Miranda comprehension (good understanding/good appreciation, good 
understanding/poor appreciation, poor understanding/poor appreciation; see Appendix 
C).  Based upon the theoretical conceptualization of understanding and appreciation in 
which understanding is a foundational capacity that must precede appreciation, only three 
levels of Miranda comprehension are included.  Inclusion of a poor understanding-good 
appreciation condition was considered and ruled out because it 1) conflicted with the 
theoretical construction of the requirements in psychology and the law, and 2) presented a 
counterintuitive set of responses in which the hypothetical defendant could not articulate 
the basic meaning of the rights, but could provide well-articulated responses about how 
the rights function.  It was reasoned that data collected in response to such a vignette 
would likely be difficult to interpret. 
The use of a hypothetical psychologist’s report does not necessarily replicate 
typical cases involving Miranda waiver challenges, as many cases do not involve 
psychological evaluations.  In many cases, judges rely upon information about how the 
suspect interacted with the police after arrest to determine whether the defendant 
understood and appreciated the rights before waiving them.  Nonetheless, a hypothetical 
13 
 
report was selected for the current study because it provided a structured method of 
providing information specifically addressing a defendant’s performance on questions 
about the Miranda warnings as well as some background information about the 
defendant.  The hypothetical reports provided much of the defendant’s background 
information typically included in psychologists’ reports, but, notably, information about 
the defendant’s intellectual functioning was omitted.  Although including an IQ score for 
the defendant in each vignette was considered, the score would need to be held constant 
across vignettes in order to vary only the variables of interest in this study.  Thus, if the 
typical IQ score for a detained population (i.e., about 85; Bove, Goldstein, Appleton, & 
Thomson, 2003; Colwell et al., 2005; Goldstein, Condie, Kalbeitzer, Osman, & Geier, 
2003; Richardson, Gudjonsson, & Kelly, 1995; Viljoen & Roesch, 2005) was selected, 
critical portions of the data would be illogical.  That is, describing a defendant with an IQ 
score in the Low Average range and presenting information that this individual scored in 
the 5
th
 and/or 95
th
 percentile on measures of Miranda comprehension would not represent 
typical performance and would likely confuse participants. 
Differences in Miranda understanding and appreciation were conveyed through 
descriptions of the defendant’s performance on measures of understanding and 
appreciation, as well as transcribed examples of the defendant’s responses to Miranda-
related questions.  The hypothetical responses provided by the suspect were based on 
responses detailed in the model reports (Heilbrun, Marcyzk, & DeMatteo, 2002) and 
example responses included for scoring purposes in the Miranda instruments manual 
(Grisso, 1998).  The defendant’s performance on Miranda instruments was described 
quantitatively by reporting the defendant’s percentile rank in comparison to his peers.  To 
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present the same raw score for both the juvenile and the adult suspect would result in 
different peer comparison (i.e., the identical raw score for a juvenile and an adult would 
place the juvenile at a higher level relative to his peers).  The use of percentile ranks 
allowed the juvenile and adult suspects to be described identically within the relevant 
peer group without relying upon raw scores. In order to examine whether judges 
theoretically and legally distinguish between knowing and intelligent, the reports were 
written to present either very good (95
th
 percentile) or very bad (5
th
 percentile) 
understanding and appreciation.  The percentile ranks were chosen based upon 
performance that is approximately two standard deviations above and below the mean.   
2.2.2  Waiver questionnaire.   
Judges were also provided with a survey that contains questions about the 
defendant’s Miranda waiver validity (see Appendix D).  The survey included questions 
rating how the judge would rule on the waiver’s validity, how confident the judge was in 
the decision, and how valid the hypothetical suspect’s waiver was on a scale.  The survey 
also asked about the sufficiency of the suspect’s understanding and appreciation of 1) the 
Miranda warnings, 2) the right to silence, and 3) the right to counsel.  Judges were also 
asked to rate the importance of defendant characteristics (e.g., IQ, age, scores on Miranda 
instruments) in their waiver determination.  Finally, the questionnaire asked judges to 
indicate whether knowing and intelligent refer to two distinct types of comprehension, 
whether only one or both are required for a valid waiver in their states, and whether only 
one or both should be required for a valid waiver. 
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2.2.3  Demographics questionnaire.   
The demographics questionnaire included questions about judges’ personal and 
professional demographics (e.g., over what type of court the judge presides, years serving 
as a judge, gender, experience with suppression hearings, familiarity with Miranda 
requirements, experience with juvenile and adult court, and whether his/her state 
distinguishes between knowing and intelligent) (see Appendix D). 
2.3  Procedures 
 The study materials were mailed as a packet to each judge.  Each packet 
contained a cover letter with consent information and general study completion 
instructions (see Appendix D), a hypothetical evaluation report, a waiver questionnaire, 
and a demographics questionnaire.  A pre-addressed envelope was provided in which 
judges could return the questionnaires.  A second wave of packets containing the same 
study materials was mailed to those same judges approximately one month after the 
initial mailing (because of the anonymous nature of the surveys, the second mailing was 
sent to all judges). 
CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
3.1  Analyses of Primary and Secondary Hypotheses 
A two-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine whether 
judges’ ratings of waiver validity differed significantly by Miranda comprehension and 
age.  Means and standard deviations for the six conditions are reported in Table 1.  A 
main effect was observed for Miranda comprehension, F(2, 121) = 65.06, p < .01, η2 = 
.52, and post-hoc analyses revealed significant differences across all three Miranda 
comprehension conditions (see Table 2 and Figure 2).  A main effect for defendant age 
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approached significance but did not meet the α = .05 criterion, F(1, 121) = 3.38, p = .07, 
η2 = .01.  The interaction effect was not significant F(2, 121) = .77, p = .47, η2 <  .01.   
Additionally, logistic regression was used to examine the effects of Miranda 
comprehension level and defendant age on the bivariate outcome variable of judges’ valid 
or invalid rulings on the suspect’s waiver.  Waiver validity was regressed on Miranda 
comprehension and age, and results indicated that both Miranda comprehension and 
defendant age significantly affected waiver validity.  Waiver validity was negatively 
related to defendant age and positively related to Miranda comprehension.  That is, the 
odds of an adult’s waiver being held valid were 4.17 times greater than the odds of a 
juvenile’s waiver, and judges were 17.28 times more likely to hold a waiver valid if the 
defendant had good understanding and poor appreciation than if he had poor 
understanding and poor appreciation (see Table 3).  Because no judges rated the waiver 
in the good understanding and good appreciation condition invalid, logistic regression 
analyses involving the good understanding and good appreciation condition could not be 
performed.  
 In order to further examine judges’ treatment of the good understanding and good 
appreciation condition, Chi-square analyses were undertaken.  An initial omnibus chi-
square test of independence revealed a significant relationship between Miranda 
comprehension condition and dichotomous waiver validity, χ2(2, N = 124) = 54.94, p < 
.01.  Post-hoc Chi-square tests using a Bonferroni correction (α = .02) indicated that the 
difference between the good understanding and good appreciation condition and the good 
understanding and poor appreciation condition approached significance but did not meet 
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the conservative α = .02 criterion, χ2(1, n = 82) = 4.60, p = .03.6  All other post-hoc 
analyses were significant (see Table 4). 
3.2  Exploratory Analyses 
3.2.1 Sufficiency of defendant’s understanding and appreciation by Miranda  
 comprehension and age.   
 
Judges also were asked to rate the sufficiency of the defendant’s understanding 
and appreciation of individual rights (i.e., rights to silence and counsel) from the Miranda 
warnings.  A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) examined whether judges’ 
ratings of the defendant’s Miranda rights comprehension sufficiency differed 
significantly by Miranda comprehension condition and defendant age condition.  A 
significant main effect was observed for Miranda comprehension (Pillai’s Trace = .92, 
F(12, 222) = 15.86, p < .01). Post-hoc analyses revealed significant differences among 
judges’ ratings of defendants in all three Miranda comprehension conditions on each of 
the comprehension sufficiency variables.  No significant age effect (Pillai’s Trace = .07, 
F(6, 110) = 1.33, p =.25) or interaction between Miranda comprehension and age was 
found (Pillai’s Trace = .09, F(12, 222) = .91, p = .53).  See Tables 5 and 6. 
3.2.2 Validity of Miranda waivers by geographic regions and demographic  
 factors.   
 
ANOVA results indicated that, while controlling for Miranda comprehension, 
judges’ ratings of the validity of the defendant’s waiver did not differ significantly by 
region, F(4, 120) = .26, p = .90, η2 < .01, or by judges’ gender, F(1, 119) = .04, p = .84, 
                                                 
6
 Using a less conservative variant of the Bonferroni correction identified by Holm (1979) results in all 
comparisons being significant.  Holm’s method is sequential such that when three comparisons are being 
made, the smallest p value must meet a .05/3 criterion to be considered significant, the second smallest p 
value must meet a .05/2 criterion to be considered significant, and the third most significant p value must 
meet a .05/1 criterion to be considered significant.  Under this variant, p = .03, as the third smallest p value, 
would meet the p < .05/1 criterion. 
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η2 <  .0017.  Because the majority of judges identified as Caucasian, insufficient sample 
size in several cells of the 3 (Miranda comprehension condition) by 7 (race/ethnicity) 
matrix prevented analysis of wavier validity ratings by race/ethnicity. 
3.2.3 Importance of defendant characteristics to Miranda waiver  
 determinations.   
 
Judges were asked to rate the importance of various characteristics of the 
defendant to their waiver validity decisions, and mean ratings are reported in Table 7.  A 
MANOVA indicated that judges’ ratings differed significantly by Miranda 
comprehension condition (Pillai’s Trace = .25, F(14, 214) = 2.20, p = .01), with post-hoc 
analyses revealing significant differences in judges’ ratings of the importance of the 
understanding measure and of the appreciation measure by Miranda comprehension 
condition.  Ratings of the characteristics did not differ significantly by geographic region 
(Pillai’s Trace = .40, F(7, 106) = .64, p = .72). See Tables 8 and 9. 
3.2.4 Judges’ self-reported perception of knowing and intelligent standard.   
Several questions on the demographic questionnaire and waiver validity 
questionnaire asked judges to share their knowledge about the knowing and intelligent 
standard and about how their states define the standard.  See Figures 3 – 6 for complete 
results.  The majority of judges (68.5%) reported that their states have case law or 
legislation establishing standards beyond those described in Miranda v. Arizona.  The 
majority of judges (78.2%) reported that the phrase “knowing and intelligent” describes 
two types of comprehension and 16.9% reported that the phrase describes one type of 
comprehension (4.0% endorsed the “Don’t know” response, 0.8% left the item blank).  
                                                 
7
 Due to the unequal group sizes when analyzing gender as a variable (101 men and 20 women), analyses 
were underpowered (observed power = .06).  Therefore, the current results may underestimate the 
relationship between gender and waiver validity ratings. 
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The majority of judges (79.0%) reported that their states require both types of 
comprehension and over three-quarters of judges (77.4%) indicated that both types of 
comprehension should be required for valid waivers.  Finally, 81.5% of judges responded 
that a defendant could provide a waiver that met the knowing requirement but not the 
intelligent requirement, and 56.5% indicated that a defendant could provide a waiver that 
met the intelligent requirement but not the knowing requirement. 
CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
 Results from the current study suggest that despite some recent case law, judges 
distinguish knowing and intelligent as two separate requirements for a valid Miranda 
waiver in the context of suppression hearings.  Mixed evidence was found regarding the 
impact of defendant’s age on judges’ ratings of waiver validity, with results differing 
based on format of outcome measures.  Notably, judges rated the good understanding and 
good appreciation (“good/good”) waiver as significantly more valid than the good 
understanding and poor appreciation (“good/poor”) waiver.  The different treatment of 
these two Miranda comprehension conditions suggests that judges consider appreciation 
separately from understanding and distinguish between the knowing and intelligent 
requirements.  Moreover, when asked explicitly, the majority of judges distinguished two 
types of comprehension and indicated that both should be required for a valid waiver.   
4.1  Implications for Defining the Waiver Standard 
The results highlight a need for a clearer definition of the knowing and intelligent 
standard, given discrepancies between judges’ treatment of the requirements as separate 
and recent judicial decisions that require fulfillment of only the knowing requirement.  
Cases like Michigan v. Daoud (2000) and Illinois v. Bernasco (1990), in which state 
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supreme courts held that a basic understanding of the Miranda rights is sufficient, define 
a distinctly lower threshold than other state courts that require both understanding and 
appreciation (e.g., Pennsylvania v. DeJesus, 2001; Arkansas v. Bell, 1997).  Although 
state courts are free to interpret state constitutions as providing greater protections than 
those derived from the federal Constitution, they may not interpret their constitutions as 
providing less protection (Arizona v. Evans, 1995; Cooper v. California, 1967; Oregon v. 
Hass, 1975).  The Miranda Court noted this principle when it stated, “Congress and the 
States are free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege [against self-
incrimination during custodial interrogation], so long as they are fully as effective as 
those described [in this decision]...” (p. 490).  In order to abide by this principle, states 
must implement informative warnings and apply a waiver standard that at least meets the 
basics required by the Court in Miranda.  With regard to defining the waiver standard, 
this suggests that a “floor” definition of what level of comprehension is sufficient to 
make a knowing and intelligent waiver would be helpful for identifying the lowest 
constitutionally acceptable threshold that states may set for Miranda waivers.   
Clear definition of a minimum level of comprehension required by the knowing 
and intelligent standard is important for encouraging consistent application of the 
standard across defendants.  Under the current circumstances, a defendant with only a 
basic understanding could be found to have validly waived Miranda rights in one 
jurisdiction, while a similar defendant with the same interrogative circumstance could be 
found to have provided an invalid waiver in another jurisdiction.  In the first jurisdiction, 
the defendant’s statements, which are often the most potent evidence in a case (Kassin, 
1997), would likely be admitted, whereas in the second jurisdiction, the defendant’s 
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statements would be found inadmissible.  Distinguishing knowing from intelligent would 
promote consistent treatment of defendants’ Miranda waivers across jurisdictions by 
encouraging the application of a baseline set of expectations for suspects in custodial 
interrogation. 
 The results of the current study support defining a “floor” threshold; however, 
judges appeared to differentiate between types of comprehension less when asked to rule 
a waiver dichotomously than when asked to identify a degree of validity.  Using a less 
conservative alpha adjustment resulted in significant differences between all Miranda 
comprehension conditions, as was found for the continuous waiver validity rating.  
Nevertheless, this contrast suggests that despite judges’ distinction between knowing and 
intelligent, they may ultimately err on the side of finding a waiver valid in cases in which 
a defendant demonstrates at least basic understanding.  Outlining more explicit 
expectations for what meets the knowing and intelligent requirements may have little 
effect in practice.  Alternatively, a more explicit definition, particularly one that is 
empirically supported, may indicate that at least some appreciation is required and turn 
the tide on the practice of erring on the side of holding a waiver valid when a defendant 
shows only basic understanding.  The finding also raises questions about whether judges 
are influenced, consciously or unconsciously, to find waivers valid.  The current 
ambiguous nature of the knowing and intelligent standard allows for the influence of 
irrelevant and inappropriate considerations, and clearer definition of the standard could 
help to promote more thoughtful evaluation of waiver validity. 
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4.2  Implications for Psychology  
The current study has implications for psychologists, forensic evaluations, and 
psycholegal measurement.  The field of psychology has traditionally conceptualized the 
knowing and intelligent standard to identify two levels of comprehension, much like in 
other areas of competency (Frumkin & Garcia, 2003; Grisso, 2003).  Based upon 
established models of competency and case law language, the psycholegal constructs of 
understanding and appreciation were defined in a manner suggesting related but distinct 
types of comprehension.  The current study shows that the majority of judges interpret, at 
least intuitively, the knowing and intelligent standard in a manner similar to how 
psychologists inferred its conceptualization (Goldstein & Goldstein, 2010).  This 
similarity lends validity to the approach to Miranda waiver evaluations in which 
psychologists measure and describe a defendant’s basic understanding of the rights and 
appreciation of the consequences of waiving rights.  The psychological conceptualization 
of the standard is also supported by the fact that judges appear to have extrapolated 
information relevant to the knowing and intelligent requirements from a hypothetical 
report that discussed the defendant’s comprehension in terms of understanding and 
appreciation.  The similarity between judges’ interpretation of the legal standard and 
psychology’s conceptualization of the relevant capacities suggests that evaluators should 
distinguish between understanding and appreciation during their assessments and in their 
presentation of evaluation data, as courts may reach holdings differentially based on 
levels of both understanding and appreciation. 
 Beyond identifying two types of comprehension, psychology has traditionally 
considered understanding and appreciation to be hierarchical, in that appreciation cannot 
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be acquired without first having a basic understanding of relevant concepts (Frumkin & 
Garcia, 2003; Grisso, 2003).  Recent research provided support for the hierarchical nature 
of the constructs by showing restricted variability in appreciation for juveniles with poor 
understanding and greater variability in appreciation for juveniles with good 
understanding, although the results were not significant (Zelle et al., 2011).  In contrast, 
the current study revealed mixed results from judges.  No judges indicated that they 
thought only intelligent comprehension is or should be required of defendants and over 
80% of judges indicated that a suspect could provide a knowing but not intelligent 
waiver, suggesting that they recognized a qualitative difference between the types of 
comprehension.  Nevertheless, the majority of judges indicated that a suspect could 
provide an intelligent but not knowing waiver, reflecting ambiguity about how the types 
of comprehension might be related.   
It appears that judges are inclined to view knowing and intelligent as referring to 
different areas of comprehension but that the majority of them also treat the two cognitive 
requirements interchangeably.  Such an approach may fit well within, and help explain, 
the larger trend of requiring only basic understanding.  It may be that many judges 
interpret the waiver standard to require two things, cognitive comprehension and 
voluntary action, and cognitive comprehension can be satisfied by meeting either the 
knowing or intelligent requirement.  Given that basic understanding is the type of 
comprehension that can occur independently, it follows that the approach may reduce to 
interpretations of the standard as requiring only basic understanding because judges are 
seeing defendants meet that type of comprehension in most cases.  Regardless of the 
reason, judges’ apparently contradictory treatment of the relationship between knowing 
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and intelligent, in which no judges reported that only intelligent should be required yet 
more than half reported that a waiver can meet the intelligent requirement alone, likely 
plays a role in the varied application of the requirements across jurisdictions.   
Given this ambiguous conceptualization by judges, a question is raised regarding 
the importance of psychology’s conceptualization of the standard.  Legal standards in 
similar areas suggest that discussing capacities above basic understanding is relevant and 
meaningful.  For example, in the competency to stand trial context, the analogous 
standard of factual and rational understanding has long been viewed as describing basic 
knowledge and the capacity to appreciate concepts and how they apply to one’s own case 
(Frumkin & Garcia, 2003; Grisso, 2003), and recent social science research has supported 
this model through factor analysis (Jacobs, Ryba, Zapf, 2008; Viljoen, Vincent, & 
Roesch, 2006; Zapf & Roesch, 2005).   
It would appear that psychology’s model of understanding and appreciation is 
better informed because it is based upon examination of both legal precedent and social 
science knowledge related to intellectual functioning and the abilities needed to grasp 
abstract concepts.  Judges’ responses in the current study may reflect a confusion about 
the relationship between knowing and intelligent stemming from, in part, a lack of 
information about comprehension abilities.  Therefore, it is important for psychologists to 
inform judges and lawyers about the empirically supported hierarchical model of 
understanding and appreciation.  Further research should be undertaken and presented to 
legal practitioners to make clear that knowing and intelligent are not interchangeable 
requirements, which will also underscore the importance of requiring both when applying 
the standard.   
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4.3  Implications for Attorneys 
Defense attorneys may find it persuasive to highlight the distinction between the 
types of comprehension when presenting evidence of their clients’ understanding and 
appreciation.  Clear presentation of deficits in a client’s rights appreciation may persuade 
a judge that, although the defendant exhibits a basic understanding of his Miranda rights, 
he has important deficits in appreciating the function of his rights.  Such an argument 
may increase the likelihood that the judge will rule the waiver invalid.  This type of 
approach may be helpful in making headway in cases of “passive” waivers, where the 
defendant did not explicitly invoke his rights and eventually made a statement to police.  
An attorney may find it helpful in those cases to raise the capacity to waive Miranda 
rights issue and present evidence that her client did not fully appreciate the right to 
silence because he did not know about its protected nature or how to invoke it.  
Alternatively, prosecuting attorneys may prefer to downplay the distinction when 
persuading the court that a defendant’s Miranda comprehension was sufficient to meet 
the waiver standard.  Such an approach could be particularly viable in jurisdictions with 
case law suggesting that only a basic understanding of rights is required.  Nevertheless, 
there may be times when highlighting the distinction could be to a prosecutor’s advantage 
because the defendant appears to have an appreciation of the rights.  Pointing to the need 
for basic understanding in order to achieve appreciation, the prosecuting attorney could 
potentially use the evaluation results to make a more compelling argument that the 
defendant’s waiver should be held valid and any inculpatory statements should be 
admitted. 
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4.4  Role of Defendant Age 
 Unexpectedly, the effect of Miranda comprehension condition on waiver validity 
rating was not moderated by defendant age in the current study, as defendant age 
approached significance but did not meet the significance criterion in the primary 
ANOVA analyses.  Although this outcome may be the result of low power, a very small 
effect size was found for age in the primary analyses, suggesting a weak relationship.  
Over 30 years of empirical studies have generally revealed a strong relationship between 
age and Miranda comprehension (e.g., Abramovitch, Peterson-Badali, & Rohan, 1995; 
Colwell et al., 2005; Grisso, 1981; Viljoen & Roesch, 2005),  but some studies have 
observed a fairly weak relationship (e.g., Goldstein et al., 2011).  Regardless of this more 
recent qualified data about the strength of the relationship, it is unlikely that judges are 
changing their approach to waiver determinations after years of practice and research 
have supported age as relevant to Miranda waiver validity.  In fact, recent U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions regarding juveniles in criminal/juvenile justice settings have explicitly 
raised age as a relevant and important factor for consideration (e.g., J.D.B. v. North 
Carolina, 2011; Graham v. Florida, 2010; Roper v Simmons, 2005).  In J.D.B. v. North 
Carolina (2011), the Court specifically noted the importance of considering age when 
determining whether a person is in custody for purposes of Miranda.   
Ultimately, defendant age emerged as significant in the logistic regression 
analyses, indicating that it did have a meaningful impact as a predictor of waiver holding.  
Significant age effects in past research have typically been found for younger 
adolescents, especially those under 14 years old (e.g., Grisso, 1981), and the juvenile 
described in the current study was 15 years old.  It may be that constraints, such as 
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having only a brief description of a 15-year-old defendant rather than a live, younger 
defendant at a suppression hearing, limited the ability of the current study to realistically 
simulate the influence of age on judges’ waiver determinations. 
4.5  Limitations  
Although the sample size was smaller than expected, the obtained sample does 
not appear to have limited the study’s power for all analyses.  Several studies have 
suggested that the estimated 20% response rate for mail surveys with judges was 
reasonable (e.g., Redding, Floyd, & Hawk, 2001; Redding & Reppucci, 1999); however, 
the range of response rates obtained by mail surveys of judges is wide.  For example, a 
recent mail survey of judges conducted by Kwartner and colleagues (2006) obtained a 
similarly low response rate of 12.7%.  In a review of survey research with judges, mail 
surveys were the most frequently used method despite low average response rates, and 
response rates ranged from 5% in a study with over 100 participants to 100% in two 
studies – one with five participants and one with 35 participants (Merlino, 1998 as cited 
in Dobbin et al., 2001).  Although an electronic mail survey may have allowed for wider 
sampling in the current study, there was no research regarding the use of electronic 
surveys with judges and the response rates that could be expected.  The small sample may 
not be as representative as possible of judges across the country and may have limited the 
power of secondary analyses, including examination of interaction effects.  Nonetheless, 
the current sample was geographically diverse and was sufficient in size to examine the 
primary hypothesis regarding the effect of Miranda comprehension type on judges’ 
ratings of waiver validity.  
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The current study also may be limited by the fact that it utilized an evaluation 
report to convey information about a hypothetical defendant.  The vignette-type format 
could not present elements that would be present during a suppression hearing involving 
various forms of information, such as the presence and appearance of the defendant 
(which, notably, may be an influential factor for age effects) and arguments by the 
prosecution and defense.  However, the vignette-type format provided opportunities for 
an experimental design that allowed for manipulation of only the independent variables.   
A potentially interesting area of analysis may have been missed by not including a 
poor understanding/good appreciation condition in the experimental design.  As noted 
earlier, there appeared to be no basis for including an apparently illogical depiction of a 
defendant with poor understanding and good appreciation.  More than half of judges, 
however, responded that it is possible to meet the intelligent requirement without meeting 
the knowing requirement, and it would have been valuable to examine whether that 
theoretical indication would be reflected in judges’ decision making when presented with 
a vignette of such a defendant.  Finally, the defendant’s levels of understanding and 
appreciation were described as very high or very low in order to generate a clean design 
with clear distinctions between conditions.  Although such extremes may have sensitized 
judges to considering knowing and intelligent as distinct capacities, the goal of this study 
was to examine whether judges would distinguish between good/good and good/poor 
Miranda comprehension conditions when evaluating waivers, and results indicated that 
judges did distinguish between these two clearly described conditions. 
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4.6  Conclusions 
 The current study provided support for conceptualizing the knowing and 
intelligent Miranda rights waiver standard as requiring two types of comprehension: 1) a 
basic understanding of the Miranda rights, and 2) an appreciation of how the rights 
function and the consequences of waiving them.  It appears that the majority of judges 
distinguish between knowing and intelligent, both when asked directly about their 
interpretation of the requirements and when reaching a waiver validity decision.  The 
study results suggest that there is reason to develop and promulgate clearer definitions 
distinguishing the knowing and intelligent requirements.  Although states are free to 
interpret greater protections from their own constitutions, it seems that a “floor” threshold 
for what the knowing and intelligent standard requires of suspects is needed.  A critical 
consequence of finding a Miranda waiver valid is the admission of inculpatory 
statements that may have followed the waiver.  Given that inculpatory statements are 
often the most powerful piece of evidence in a case (Kassin, 1997), there is an important 
interest in clarifying the analysis of waiver validity to promote thorough and consistent 
evaluation across jurisdictions. 
 This study presents an initial investigation of how judges apparently view and 
apply the knowing and intelligent requirements, and additional research is needed to 
further develop this area.  Replication of this study using a mixed-method survey design 
would be worthwhile to potentially widen the sample of judges surveyed and support or 
refine the current results.  Replication or similar experimental studies would allow for 
further examination of the effect of defendant age as well by presenting descriptions of 
younger juveniles.  Research on age effects may be a critical entree for making 
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arguments about the importance of requiring both understanding and appreciation, as 
attention to the vulnerabilities of juveniles in the justice system is likely to be persuasive.  
It is worth noting that the current project was undertaken before the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) opinion was handed down – an opinion that not 
only noted the importance of considering age in justice contexts, but also demonstrated a 
step forward in the Court’s acceptance and use of social science research to support its 
opinions.  After J.D.B., it seems that the Court is increasingly open to considering social 
science evidence in its deliberations, particularly when it comes to issues affecting 
juveniles. 
Other future research may include reviewing suppression hearing transcripts to 
examine how defendants are evaluated by judges, including how a defendant’s Miranda 
comprehension is described by attorneys or experts, as well as how judges are actually 
ruling in cases in which defendants appear to have differing levels of Miranda 
comprehension.  In addition, review of transcripts may highlight which characteristics of 
defendants are actually associated with, and even predictive of, validity rulings.  Such 
research will be important for further identifying how judges are applying the knowing 
and intelligent standard, and whether their practices are consistent with the psycholegal 
model of understanding and appreciation.  It appears that case law does not lead to the 
interpretation of knowing and intelligent as distinct requirements reliant upon hierarchical 
capacities, yet initial research around the understanding and appreciation capacities 
supports the hierarchical model.  It will be important to identify what it is that judges are 
doing in waiver validity cases, as well as ground the hierarchical model in empirical data, 
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in order to present a persuasive argument for the adoption of the model by legal 
practitioners.   
Finally, clearer definitions of the knowing and intelligent standard and/or what 
suspects are expected to comprehend about the Miranda rights could be drafted and 
submitted to panels of judges and legal experts for review.  Review of such definitions 
could provide further insight into how judges interpret the standard.  Feedback may 
highlight how the standard could best be explicated  by indicating what legal practitioners 
view as descriptive of the standard and where additional interpretive guidance is 
necessary.  In addition, results of such feedback could, perhaps, provide model 
definitions that jurisdictions could choose to implement if they so wished.  
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Appendix A: Tables 
 
 
 
Table 1   
 
Mean (SD) Waiver Validity Scores for Miranda Comprehension Condition x Age 
Conditions 
 
 Age 
 Juvenile Defendant Adult Defendant 
Good Understanding, Good 
Appreciation 
4.63 (.65) 4.64 (.63) 
Good Understanding, Poor 
Appreciation 
3.47 (.94) 4.00 (.82) 
Poor Understanding, Poor 
Appreciation 
2.04 (1.26) 2.44 (1.04) 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Post-hoc Results: Main Effect of Miranda Comprehension Condition on Waiver Validity 
Rating 
 
 Good understanding, Poor 
appreciation 
Poor understanding, Poor 
appreciation 
Good understanding, Good 
appreciation 
Mean difference = .85*** 2.41*** 
Good understanding Poor 
appreciation 
 1.57*** 
 *p < .05.  **p < .01.  ***p < .001. 
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Table 3   
 
Logistic Regression of Waiver Validity Ruling 
 
Predictor b SEb 
Wald’s 
χ2 df p 
e
 b  
(odds 
ratio) IOR 
Constant -.01 .43 < .01 1 .98 .99 --- 
Miranda 
Comprehension 
(1) 
22.27 6350.29 < .01 1 1.00 < .01 --- 
Miranda 
Comprehension 
(2) 
2.85 .61 21.67 1 < .01 17.28 --- 
Defendant age -1.44 .58 6.19 1 .01 .24 4.17 
Test   χ2 df p   
Goodness-of-fit 
test 
       
Hosmer & 
Lemeshow 
  
.30 4 .99   
 
 
 
Table 4  
 
Differences between Miranda Comprehension Conditions on Dichotomous Validity 
Rating 
 
Conditions χ2 p φ 
Good understanding and good 
appreciation  
Good understanding and poor 
appreciation 
4.60 (1, n = 82) .03 .32 
Good understanding and good 
appreciation 
Poor understanding and poor 
appreciation 
39.92 (1, n = 81) < .01 .70 
Good understanding and poor 
appreciation  
Poor understanding and poor 
appreciation 
28.73 (1, n = 87) < .01 .58 
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Table 5   
 
Main Effect of Miranda Comprehension Condition on Comprehension Sufficiency 
 
Sufficiency variable F p η2 
Comprehension of 
warnings 
105.30(2, 120) < .001 .64 
Comprehension of 
right to silence 
87.04(2, 120) < .001 .60 
Comprehension of 
right to counsel 
124.63(2, 120) < .001 .68 
Comprehension of 
waiving rights 
96.58(2, 120) < .001 .63 
Comprehension of 
waiving right to 
silence 
76.00(2, 120) < .001 .56 
Comprehension of 
waiving right to 
counsel 
85.63(2, 120) < .001 .59 
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Table 6   
 
Post-hoc Results: Main Effect of Miranda Comprehension Condition on Comprehension 
Sufficiency  
 
Comprehension of warnings 
 Good/Poor Poor/Poor 
Good/Good Mean difference = .84*** 2.82*** 
Good/Poor  1.98*** 
Comprehension of  right to silence 
 Good/Poor Poor/Poor 
Good/Good .57* 2.72*** 
Good/Poor  2.15*** 
Comprehension of right to counsel  
 Good/Poor Poor/Poor 
Good/Good .64** 2.87*** 
Good/Poor  2.22*** 
Comprehension of waiving rights 
 Good/Poor Poor/Poor 
Good/Good 1.08*** 2.78*** 
Good/Poor  1.70*** 
Comprehension of waiving right to silence  
 Good/Poor Poor/Poor 
Good/Good 1.32*** 2.69*** 
Good/Poor  1.36*** 
Comprehension of waiving right to counsel  
 Good/Poor Poor/Poor 
Good/Good 1.03*** 2.68*** 
Good/Poor  1.65*** 
 *p < .05.  **p < .01.  ***p < .001. 
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Table 7   
 
Mean Importance Ratings of Defendant Characteristics 
 
Characteristic Mean (SD) 
Mental health 3.76 (.96) 
Intelligence 3.63 (.98) 
Performance on understanding measure 3.37 (1.26) 
Performance on appreciation measure 3.32 (1.23) 
Age 3.14 (1.14) 
Previous experience with criminal justice 
system 
2.96 (1.11) 
Academic performance 2.79 (.94) 
 Note. The range of scores for all variables was 1 – 5. 
 
 
 
Table 8   
 
Main Effect of Miranda Comprehension Condition on Importance of Defendant 
Characteristic 
 
Importance variable F p η2 
Mental Health .31 (2, 116) .73 .005 
Intelligence .66 (2, 116) .52 .01 
Performance on understanding measure 4.13 (2, 116) .02 .07 
Performance on appreciation measure 7.30 (2, 116) < .01 .12 
Age .56 (2, 116) .57 .01 
Previous experience with criminal justice 
system 
1.34 (2, 116) .27 .02 
Academic performance .25 (2, 116) .78 .004 
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Table 9   
 
Post-hoc Results: Main Effect of Miranda Comprehension Condition on Judges’ Ratings 
of Defendant Characteristic 
 
Performance on understanding measure 
 Good/Poor Poor/Poor 
Good/Good Mean difference = .51 .24 
Good/Poor  .75* 
Performance on appreciation measure 
 Good/Poor Poor/Poor 
Good/Good .71* .24 
Good/Poor  .95** 
 *p < .05.  **p < .01.  ***p < .001. 
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Appendix B: Figures 
 
 
 
 Age 
 Juvenile Adult 
M
ir
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n
d
a
 
co
m
p
re
h
en
si
o
n
 
co
n
d
it
io
n
 
Good Understanding 
Good Appreciation 
Good Understanding 
Good Appreciation 
Good Understanding 
Poor Appreciation 
Good Understanding 
Poor Appreciation 
Poor Understanding 
Poor Appreciation 
Poor Understanding 
Poor Appreciation 
Figure 1.  Between subjects research design: Defendant age x Miranda comprehension 
condition. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Judges’ mean waiver validity scores for Miranda Comprehension Conditions 
and Defendant’s Age Conditions 
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Figure 3.  Percent of judges reporting their state has case law or legislation establishing 
standards beyond Miranda v. Arizona (1966) for 1) juveniles, 2) adults, 3) juveniles and 
adults, 4) neither, or 5) don’t know.  Four percent left the item blank. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Percent of judges reporting the type of comprehension required by their state to 
be 1) only knowing, 2) only intelligent, 3) both knowing and intelligent, 4) the term 
knowing and intelligent describes only one type of comprehension, or 5) don’t know.  Of 
respondents, 1.6% left the item blank. 
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Figure 5.  Percent of judges reporting that the type of comprehension that should be 
required for a valid waiver is 1) only knowing, 2) only intelligent, 3) both knowing and 
intelligent, 4) the term describes only one type of comprehension, or 5) don’t know.  Of 
respondents, 1.6% left the item blank. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 6. Percent of judges that responded a defendant can make a knowing but not 
intelligent waiver and the percent of judges that responded a defendant can make an 
intelligent but not knowing waiver.  
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Appendix C: Hypothetical Evaluation Report for Adult Defendant with Good 
Understanding and Good Appreciation 
 
 
 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF JOHN S. 
 
REFERRAL 
 John S. is a 25-year-old male charged with Aggravated Assault.  The police read 
the Miranda warnings to him when he was arrested.  John’s attorney filed a motion 
challenging the validity of John’s Miranda waiver.  A mental health evaluation was 
ordered to provide the court with information relevant to John’s capacity to waive 
Miranda rights. 
 
RELEVANT HISTORY 
 John is the second of three children.  He reported that his parents divorced when 
he was 5 years old and that he lived with his mother after the divorce.  According to 
John’s school records, he never repeated a grade, generally received Cs in his classes, and 
had an average number of absences (approximately 12 per school year).  Both John and 
his school records indicated that he was involved in two fights at school for which he was 
suspended. John completed the 8
th
 grade, but dropped out of school in the 9
th
 grade.  
After dropping out, John worked a series of unskilled jobs, such as mowing lawns and 
fast food preparation.  John indicated, and his records confirmed, that he has no prior 
legal history. 
 
CURRENT CLINICAL CONDITION 
 At the time of the evaluation, John was 25 years old.  He was oriented to person, 
place, and time, and his thought processes were clear and goal-directed.  John denied the 
presence of hallucinations, and there was no evidence of delusions.  John was cooperative 
throughout the evaluation.  A previous psychological report indicated that John had never 
been diagnosed with any mental, emotional, or behavioral problem.   
 
ABILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH CAPACITY TO WAIVE MIRANDA RIGHTS 
 John completed the Instruments for Assessing Understanding and Appreciation of 
Miranda Rights, a set of standardized, well-researched tests designed to evaluate abilities 
associated with the capacity to waive Miranda rights.  On an instrument that required 
John to describe the meaning of each right in his own words, he scored in the 95
th
 
percentile of the normative peer sample, indicating that he scored better than 95% of his 
46 
 
peers.  On an instrument that required John to respond to a series of questions about the 
function of Miranda rights in relevant legal contexts, he scored in the 95
th
 percentile of 
the normative peer sample, indicating that he scored better than 95% of his peers.   
John was asked to explain his understanding of the meaning and implication of 
each Miranda warning.  John explained the right to remain silent as meaning “that I can 
decide not to say anything if I don’t want to.”  He was asked about the consequences if he 
chose to remain silent.  He replied, “The police have to let me not talk because it’s my 
choice to not talk.  They can’t force me or anything, they have to leave me alone.”  John 
was asked to explain the consequences of giving up the right to remain silent.  He stated, 
“The things I say, the police put it down in their records, then later they can repeat it in 
court.  Staying silent means I won’t give them information that looks bad for me, so 
talking means I could end up giving them information they could use as evidence.”  John 
was asked to explain what it meant for his statements to be used against him.  He stated, 
“Whatever I say can be used in court to make it look like I did it.  What I say can be 
evidence that hurts my case.”  
He explained that the right to an attorney meant that he could “ask to have an 
attorney there with me at the police station, to talk to me and explain things.”  John was 
asked when he could have the attorney with him.  He replied, “before I answer any 
questions and while the police ask me questions, too.”  John was asked about the 
meaning of the right to appointed counsel.  He stated, “I can still have a lawyer, even if I 
don’t have enough money to pay for one.  The court gives me one.”  When asked about 
the role of a defense attorney, John stated that the attorney “is there to help the person 
who was arrested – to explain what is going on, help out the person to make decisions 
about what to say.  He’s there to defend you and keep you from going to jail.”  John was 
asked to explain the consequences of giving up the right to an attorney during 
questioning.  John replied, “Then I’d be talking to the police by myself with no one to 
help me figure out what to say or explain what’s going on.”   
When asked about asserting the rights after beginning to talk with police, John 
replied that the warning meant “I can decide to stop talking after I started – to talk to my 
lawyer or if I think the questions will bring up things I don’t want to talk about.”  John 
was also asked about the purpose of the Miranda rights more broadly.  He replied, 
“They’re rights, like protections for you...they tell you that you can say nothing, that you 
can talk to a lawyer.  They are things you can do and no one can tell you that you can’t do 
them.” 
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Appendix D: Cover Letter to Judges, Waiver Questionnaire, and 
Demographics Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Dear Judge [insert name], 
 
As part of the JD-PhD program in Law and Psychology at Drexel University, we are 
conducting a research study on judges’ determinations of Miranda waiver validity.  Your 
unique knowledge and insight is vitally important for informing psychologists about what 
they should include in their reports.  In order to improve the reports that psychologists 
prepare for courts like yours, we are interested in learning about what judges deem 
sufficient to meet Miranda waiver requirements. 
 Drexel University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) has approved this research 
study (IRB #XXXX). 
 Participation in this study is completely voluntary.  Your return of the survey will 
constitute consent for your responses to be used in this research. 
 This study will not request any identifying information.  All data will be kept in a 
secure location.   
 The survey materials will take approximately 15 minutes to complete.   
 
The survey materials consist of excerpts from a capacity to waive Miranda rights 
evaluation report, a questionnaire about the evaluation, and a demographics 
questionnaire.  The capacity to waive report provides information about a defendant, 
including a brief background of the case and personal history information.  The 
questionnaire then asks about your judgments about the defendant’s capacity to have 
waived Miranda rights based on the information in the report.  
If you are willing to participate: 
 Please read the report and then answer the questions in the order they are presented.  
Please do not skip ahead or return to questions that you have already answered.   
 If you are uncomfortable answering a question, please skip it.  
 If you would like to provide additional feedback, please feel free to do so in the 
space provided on the last page of the materials.  
 
After you have completed the forms, please return them in the envelope provided.  Please 
do not write your name on any of the forms in the packet. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns, please contact Naomi E. Goldstein, Ph.D. at 
[xxxx] or Heather Zelle, M.S. at [xxxx].  
 
Sincerely, 
Heather Zelle, M.S. 
Ph.D. Candidate, Clinical Psychology 
Drexel University 
Thank you very much for your time. 
Your participation in this study is very valuable and greatly appreciated. 
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1.  How would you rule on the validity of John’s Miranda waiver? 
 
  □ His waiver was invalid  □ His waiver was valid 
 
 
2.  Given the information provided, how confident are you about this ruling? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
confident 
 Moderately 
confident 
 Completely 
confident 
 
 
3.  If you could rate waiver validity on a sliding scale, how would you rate the validity of 
John’s Miranda waiver? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all valid  Moderately 
valid 
 Completely 
valid 
 
 
Please answer questions 4 - 9 using the scale from “not at all sufficient” (1) to 
“completely sufficient” (5): 
 
 Not at all 
sufficient 
 Moderately 
sufficient 
 Completely 
sufficient 
4. How sufficient was John’s 
comprehension of the meaning of 
the Miranda warnings? 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. How sufficient was John’s 
comprehension of the meaning of 
the right to silence? 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. How sufficient was John’s 
comprehension of the meaning of 
the right to counsel? 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. How sufficient was John’s 
comprehension of the 
consequences of waiving the 
rights? 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. How sufficient was John’s 
comprehension of the 
consequences of waiving the 
right to silence? 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. How sufficient was John’s 
comprehension of the 
consequences of waiving the 
right to counsel? 
1 2 3 4 5 
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How important a role did each of the defendant characteristics listed below play in your 
Miranda waiver determination? 
 
 Not at all 
important 
 Moderately 
important 
 Very 
important 
10. Age 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Intelligence 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. Mental health 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. Academic performance 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Performance on the 
instrument measuring 
comprehension of the meaning  
of the Miranda warnings 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. Performance on the 
instrument measuring 
comprehension of the 
consequences of waiving 
Miranda rights 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. Previous experience with 
the criminal justice system 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. Were any other 
characteristics important to 
your determination? 
             □ Yes   □ No 
If yes, please specify: 
     
a. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
c. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Please continue on the back of this page if additional characteristics were important to your 
determination. 
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18.  Do the waiver requirements “knowing” and “intelligent” describe one legally 
required type of comprehension or two legally required types of comprehension? 
 □ One type of comprehension  
 □ Two types of comprehension       
 □ Don’t know 
 
19.  In order for a waiver to be valid in your state, are both “knowing” and “intelligent” 
required? 
 □ Only knowing is required     
 □ Only intelligent is required      
 □ Both are required  
 □ The terms describe one requirement  
 □ Don’t know 
 
20. Should both “knowing” and “intelligent” be required? 
 □ Only knowing should be required      
 □ Only intelligent should be required      
 □ Both should be required  
 □ The terms describe one requirement 
 □ Don’t know 
 
21.  Assume that knowing and intelligent constitute two different types of 
comprehension.  In theory, could a defendant provide a waiver that meets the knowing 
requirement but not the intelligent requirement? 
 □ Yes □ No 
 
22.  Continue assuming that knowing and intelligent constitute two different types of 
comprehension.  In theory, could a defendant provide a waiver that meets the intelligent 
requirement but not the knowing requirement? 
 □ Yes □ No 
 
 
23. How old was the defendant?  _______   (Please do not refer back to the report.) 
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1.  In what state are you a judge? _________________________ 
 
2.  Over what type(s) of court do you preside? (Check all that apply.) 
 □ Criminal court  
□ Juvenile court  
□ Civil court          
□ Appellate court 
  □ Your state’s highest court, specifically    
 □ Other (please specify) __________________________________ 
 
3. What was/were your position(s) before becoming a judge? (Check all that apply.) 
 □ Prosecutor 
 □ Private criminal defense attorney 
 □ Public defender 
 □ Transactional lawyer 
 □ Civil trial lawyer/litigator 
 □ Other (please specify) _______________________________________ 
 
4.  How many years have you been a judge? __________________ 
 
5.  Approximately how many Miranda waiver cases have you reviewed in the past year? 
 □ 0 
 □ 1-5 
 □ 6-10 
 □ 11-15 
 □ 16-20 
 □ 21 or more 
 
6.  Approximately how many Miranda waiver cases have you reviewed in your career?  
□ 0 
 □ 1-25 
 □ 26-50 
 □ 51-75 
□ 76-100 
□ More than 100 
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7.  Is there precedent or legislation in your jurisdiction that establishes detailed standards 
or requirements (beyond what is described in Miranda v. Arizona) for waiver validity 
determinations? 
 □ Yes, for juveniles     □ Yes, for adults       □ Yes, for both 
□ No  □ Don’t know 
 
 
7(a). If your state has additional standards for juveniles, do the standards require 
parent/ guardian presence during custodial interrogation? 
□ Yes     □ No  □ Don’t know 
 
7(b). If your state has additional standards for juveniles, do the standards allow 
juveniles  
to waive their Miranda rights? 
□ Yes     □ No  □ Don’t know 
 
 
8.  Have you presided over a juvenile case involving a Miranda waiver challenge? 
□ Yes (Please answer 8(a-c))     □ No (Please skip to question 9) 
 
8(a). When you consider a juvenile’s comprehension of the Miranda warning, do 
you look only at the information and concepts the juvenile comprehends or do 
you compare the juvenile’s comprehension to the comprehension of others? 
 □ Consider only the information and concepts the juvenile comprehends 
□ Compare the juvenile’s comprehension to the comprehension of others 
 
8(b).  If you compare the juvenile’s Miranda comprehension to that of others, 
against whom do you compare comprehension? (you may select more than one 
answer) 
 □ Other juvenile justice-involved youth 
□ Community youth 
□ Criminal justice-involved adults 
□ Community adults 
□ I do not compare juvenile’s comprehension to that of others 
 
8(c).  Against whom do you believe juveniles’ Miranda comprehension should be 
compared?   
□ Other juvenile justice-involved youth 
□ Community youth 
□ Criminal justice-involved adults 
□ Community adults 
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□ I do not compare juvenile’s comprehension to that of others 
 
 
9.  In what type of location do you hear cases? 
 □ Urban □ Suburban        □ Rural 
 
10.  What is your gender? 
 □ Male □ Female 
 
11.  What is your age? __________ 
 
12. What is your racial/ethnic identification? (Check all that apply.) 
 □ American Indian or Alaskan Native 
 □ Asian or Pacific Islander 
 □ African American/Black 
 □ Hispanic 
 □ White 
 □ Other 
 □ Prefer not to answer 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your time. 
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